On Strategy

What went wrong in Vietnam? Applying the principles of war (based on the classic On War by Carl von Clausewitz) to the actual conduct of the fighting in Vietnam, the author provides some cogent answers to this question. It is not possible to do justice to the comprehensive nature of this author's arguments in a summary. However, among the points he raises are: the differences between the civilian planning done by government bureaucracy and the actual strategy of military operations; our failure to learn from the Korean experience -- how we "took counsel of our fears" and surrendered the initiative to the enemy; how we failed to distinguish between the internal Vietnamese problems and the threat of North Vietnamese aggression, or to discern how the North used insurgency as a cloak to hide their real objective. Having been written for the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, On Strategy is already in use as a text there and elsewhere in the major universities. It is a book that ought to be read by every thoughtful citizen. All signs point to On Strategy as being one of the most important books on the subject of Vietnam as well as on war strategy and politics. - Jacket flap.